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Cmi.PoRATIONs--"PERsoNAL INTEREST" OF DIRECTORS IN CoRPORATE TRANs-
ACTIONs--Serious dissension had developed between two factions of the seven: 
member board of directors of defendant corporation. Group A, consisting of four 
members, represented a working majority of the outstanding stock recently 
acquired by a group of investors. Group B, consisting of three members, had 
constituted the active management of the corporation for a number of years. 
The resignation of group B was probable if group A continued to dominate the 
board. It was proposed that stock of the defendant be exchanged for stock in 
another corporation. Under the overall plan, group A was to resign and two 
members of this group were to sell their stock in the defendant corporation at 
a price one-third above the market price. Group B was to remain with the 
corporation as officers and directors. This plan was approved unanimously by 
the board, and was submitted in detail to a special meeting of the stockholders 
who approved the plan by a vote of 14 to 1 (84% of the issued and outstanding 
stock voting). Minority stockholders brought a derivative suit against the cor-
poration and its officers to enjoin consummation of the plan. The district court 
granted the injunction. On appeal, held, affirmed. The personal interest of the 
directors in the plan was such as to deprive the stockholders of the unprejudiced 
judgment to which they were entitled. Seagrwe Corp. v. Mount, Spain v. 
Moimt, (6th Cir. 1954) 212 F. (2d) 389. . 
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As a general proposition corporate directors are required to guide the activi-
ties of their corporation for the benefit of the stockholders.1 To this end the 
courts have been unanimous in declaring that directors are fiduciaries for their 
corporation.2 It is also agreed that equity, at the option of the corporation, will 
enjoin consummation of a transaction which involves a breach of the fiduciary 
duty owed to the corporation.3 But conllict among the courts arises in attempting 
to define what factual situations constitute a breach. The most troublesome 
cases in this area are those in which a director has a "personal interest" in a 
corporate transaction.4 In formulating the legal rules to be applied in each case, 
protection of the interest of the stockholder in the corporation must be balanced 
against freedom of corporate business activity. Where a corporate transaction 
involving an "interested" director has been challenged in the past, the decisions 
may be divided into four main groups.5 First, those holding that a director is a 
trustee with the corporation as the cestui que trust.6 Under this analogy any 
corporate transaction involving a director is voidable at the option of the corpo-
ration. Second, those holding that transactions involving directors are not void-
able if approved by an "uninterested" majority of the board.7 Third, those hold-
ing that in addition to approval by an "uninterested" majority of the board, the 
transaction must be "fair" ( with the burden of proving fairness on the propo-
nent of the transaction).8 Fourth, those holding that the "fairness" of the trans-
action is the only test.9 Under the decisions in the first three groups, if approval 
1 Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 204 Mich. 459, 170 N.W. 668 (1919); Markovitz v. 
Markovitz, 336 Pa. 145, 8 A. (2d) 46 (1939); Dwyer v. Tracey, (D.C. Ill. 1954) 118 F. 
Supp. 289; Brown v. Little, Brown & Co., 269 Mass. 102, 168 N.E. 521 (1929); 3 
FLETCHER, CYc. CoRP. §838 (1947); Dodd, "For Whom Are Corporate Managers Trus-
tees?" 45 HAnv. L. REv. 1145 (1932); Berle, "For Whom Corporate Managers Are Trus-
tees," 45 HAnv. L. REv. 1365 (1932). 
2 Gilbert v. McLeod Infirmary, 219 S.C. 174, 64 S.E. (2d) 524 (1951); Paddock v. 
Siemoneit, 147 Tex. 571, 218 S.W. (2d) 428 (1949); 20 lowA L. REv. 808 (1935); 3 
FLETCHER, CYc. CoRP. §838 (1947). In addition the directors may be fiduciaries for the 
stockholders, Meadows v. Bradshaw-Diehl Co., (W.Va. 1954) 81 S.E. (2d) 63; or for the 
corporate creditors, Beach v. Williamson, 78 Fla. 611, 83 S. 860 (1919). 
3 City Bank Farmers Trust Co. v. Hewitt Realty Co., 257 N.Y. 62, 177 N.E. 309 
(1931); 13 AM. JtIR., Corporations §§423, 451 (1938); 97 Am. St. Rep. 29 (1904); Dodd, 
"Is Effective Enforcement of the Fiduciary Duties of Corporate Managers Practicable?" 2 
Umv. Cm. L. R.Ev. 194 (1935). 
4 "Personal interest" of the director refers to the fact that the director will benefit 
economically from the corporate transaction. The director's interest may be adverse to the 
interest of the corporation or directly tied to the interest of the corporation. In either case 
the director will not be able to give the "unprejudiced judgment" required by the court in 
the principal case. 
5 This grouping does not include decisions which were governed by state statutes. 
6 Ashman v. Miller, (6th Cir. 1939) 101 F. (2d) 85; Berle, "Corporate Powers as 
Powers in Trust," 44 HARv. L. REv. 1049 (1931). Since a director does not have legal 
title to corporate property, the term "quasi-trustee" is commonly used. 
7 U.S. Rolling Stock Co. v. The Atlantic & G. W. R. Co., 34 Ohio St. 450 (1878); 
Budd v. Walla Walla Printing & Publishing Co., 2 Wash. Terr. 347, 7 P. 896 (1885). 
8 Cases are collected in BALLANTINE, CoRPORATIONS §72 (1946); 3 FLETCHER, CYc. 
CoRP. §§935, 936 (1947). The majority of American courts today fall within this group. 
o Landstreet v. Meyer, 201 Miss. 826, 29 S. (2d) 653 (1947); Monroe v. Scofield, 
(10th Cir. 1943) 135 F. (2d) 725; Public Service Commission v. Indianapolis, 193 Ind. 
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by an "uninterested" majority of the board is lacking, a minority stockholder is 
able to block a transaction which may be mutually beneficial to the corporation 
and the stockholders. Justification for this control by minority stockholders must 
rest on the policy consideration which inspired the legal rules, i.e., protection 
for the stockhold~rs. In the principal case the court found that the proposed 
plan was not at variance with what sound business judgment would call for 
under the circumstances. It also found that full disclosure of all material facts 
concerning the plan had been made to the stockholders prior to the special 
meeting.10 In the light of these findings, it is difficult to see what measure of 
protection was afforded to the stockholders by the present decision.11 The fact 
that a majority of the directors would personally benefit from the transaction 
does not of itself indicate that the interest of the stockholders in the corporation 
would suffer. Rigid adherence to such a rule may easily defeat the very purpose 
of the rule. The result of many of the decisions within the .first three groups 
above is to restrict freedom of corporate business activity with no corresponding 
gain in protection for the stockholders. If, as in the fourth group of cases, the 
court will review the "fairness" of the transaction, the fact that a majority of 
the board of directors is personally interested becomes merely another factor to 
be considered in determining the issue of "fairness."12 This approach to the 
problem, together with the traditional legal sanctions against fraud and director's 
secret profits, would achieve the desired results without unduly restricting 
business freedom. 
Richard R. Dailey 
37, 137 N.E. 705 (1922). An inherent danger of this test is the use of ''hindsight" by 
the court; for this reason it has been suggested that the standard should be "the reasonable 
and uninterested director under the circumstances." 61 HAnv. L. REv. 335 (1948). 
10 There is always the possibility of ratification of the transaction by the stockholders. 
The court in the principal case rejects this idea because of the inHuence. of the majority 
group of directors in the solicitation and use of the proxies. 
11 From the language of the present opinion it is impossible to tell which of the 
first three groups given above governed this decision. 
12 In cases involving a contract between two corporations with common directors, a 
majority of American courts do apply the "fairness" test. BAiiANTINE, CoRPORATIONS 
§67 (1946). 
